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ESSAY
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure:
The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend
of Criminal Defendants?
STEPHANOS BlBAS*
ABSTRACT
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia's majority opinion reinterpreted
the Confrontation Clause to exclude otherwise reliable testimonial hearsay
unless the defendant has been able to cross-examine it. In Blakely v. Washing-
ton, Justice Scalia's majority opinion required that juries, not judges, find
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that trigger sentences above ordinary
sentencing-guidelines ranges. Crawford and Blakely are prime case studies in
the strengths, weaknesses, and influence of originalism and formalism in crimi-
nal procedure. Crawford succeeded because it cleared away muddled case law,
laid a strong foundation in the historical record, and erected a simple, solid,
workable rule. Blakely failed, in contrast, because the historical record is weak,
the Court was unwilling to be radical enough, and its bright-line rule is
inflexible and impractical. This Essay considers whether originalism and formal-
ism are compatible, which methodology takes precedence, and how much they
influence other members of the Court.
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INTRODUCTIO
Though commentators frequently caricature Supreme Court decisions as a
battle between the left and right wings, this neat, politicized diagram has always
been too crude. In 2004, the Court outdid itself in defying stereotypes. Justice
Scalia, long the darling of tough-on-crime conservatives, authored two sweep-
ing majority opinions that vindicated criminal defendants' rights: Crawford v.
Washington reinterpreted the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to ex-
clude reliable testimonial hearsay unless the defendant has been able to cross-
examine it. I Blakely v. Washington required that juries-not judges-find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, all facts that trigger sentences above ordinary
sentencing-guidelines ranges? In both cases, conservative Justice Thomas and
liberal Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia's opinions.
And in both, the pragmatic swing Justice who supposedly controlled the Court,
Justice O'Connor, disagreed sharply with Justice Scalia's reasoning and ap-
proach.
Justice Scalia has occasionally shown a libertarian, pro-defendant streak in
the past,3 but Crawford and Blakely mark the triumph of his approach. In each
case, Justice Scalia had advocated an originalist, formalist rethinking of that
area of law years earlier. 4 And, in each case, a majority of the Court eventually
came around to his view. Even Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, who are
wedded to neither originalism nor formalism, embraced these principles in
Crawford and Blakely. Why')
This Essay uses Crawford and Blakely as case studies to evaluate Justice
Scalia's originalism and formalism in criminal procedure and their influence on
the rest of the Supreme Court. Rather than surveying the vast literature on
originalism and formalism, I will focus on Justice Scalia's own brands of each
doctrine and how they have shaped two areas of criminal procedure. Part I
L 541 US. 36, 68-69 (2004).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-38 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660-63 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a United States citizen captured in Afghanistan could not be detained as an enemy combatant but
had to be charged with a crime or released); Maryland v. Craig, 497 US. 836, 862, 869-70 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that videotaped testimony by child witnesses does not satisfy the
Confrontation Clause's requirement of face-to-face confrontation in open court); Nat'l Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-87 (1989) (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment should forbid routine suspicionless urinalysis of employees).
4. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing a precursor of
the rule in Crawford); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 736-38 (1998) (Scalia, 1., dissenting)
(endorsing a precursor of the rule in Blakely); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US. 224, 260,
271 (1998) (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (suggesting a precursor of the rule in Blakely); White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 358, 365 (1992) (Thomas, 1., joined by Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing a precursor of the
rule in Crawford).
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briefly sets forth Justice Scalia's versions of originalism and formalism and
explains the main virtues and vices that he sees in them.
Parts II and III then critique Crawford and Blakely as exercises in originalism
and formalism, illustrating the virtues and vices of using these approaches in
criminal procedure. As Part II explains, Crawford's originalism and formalism
succeeded, in part, because pre-Crawford case law was an unprincipled, inconsis-
tent, ad hoc, dismal failure. Crawford also had good soil in which to root its
decision, because the Founding-era history clearly reveals the key purpose
behind the Confrontation Clause. And while it will take tim~ for common-law
adjudication to map out Crawford's contours, its broad outlines are clear,
simple, and hard to evade.
Part III contends that Blakely's originalism and formalism, though superfi-
cially appealing, were far more problematic than Crawford's. Blakely performed
a great service by asking deep questions about what is a crime and what
deserves punishment, but it came at a very high price. Although pre-Blakely
case law provided no bright line, other safeguards were available to protect
defendants' rights. The history on which Blakely rests is shifting sand, with
evidence so thin that judges and scholars can easily disagree about its meaning.
Moreover, the Court was ultimately unwilling to embrace a radical return to the
eighteenth century by abolishing plea bargaining or judicial sentencing discre-
tion. Because these other methods of evasion remain open, Blakely's half of an
originalist loaf may be unworkable and worse than none at all. Blakely's
bright-line rule is insensitive to the danger of evasion, the need for flexible
experimentation, and concerns about practicality and equality. Ultimately, then,
the substantive question at the heart of Blakely drowned amid the myriad
procedural problems surrounding it.
Part IV considers how compatible originalism and formalism are and what
happens if they conflict. In many areas of criminal procedure, the text and
historical record reveal a bright-line rule, in which case originalism promotes
formalism. But often the text and historical record are unclear or point to a
multi-factor balancing test rather than a formalistic rule. This is true, for
example, in search-and-seizure law, where courts invented a warrant require-
ment more rigid than the Fourth Amendment's historic reasonableness standard.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia suggested that originalism, not formalism, is the
foundational principle. But in the Blakely line of cases, Justice Scalia reveals
what I suspect are his true formalist colors; formalism, not originalism, was
Blakely's foundation. Indeed, at times Justice Scalia seems to embrace original-
ism precisely as a brand of formalism. To him, originalism is appealing as a
bright-line way of resolving cases with a minimum of judicial discretion and
unpredictability. But originalism cannot succeed in its aims when no majority of
the Court consistently adheres to that approach. Nevertheless, originalism holds
enough appeal that it often sways Justices who are not thoroughgoing original-
ists. Originalism, in ShOli, is a powerful force in criminal procedure and often
dovetails with formalism. But while formalism may drive Justice Scalia's
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.criminal procedure jurisprudence, it has much less independent influence over
other members of the Court.
This Essay concludes that both originalism and formalism deserve prominent
places in criminal procedure. Their shortcomings, however, should temper
adherence to either approach. Justice Scalia has done the Court a great service
by giving renewed prominence to originalism and formalism. He has done a
disservice in Blakely, however, by exalting formalism so far above humility,
practicality, and plain old common sense. In short, originalism and formalism
deserve two cheers, not three, in criminal procedure.
1. JUSTICE SCALIA'S VERSION OF ORIGINALISM AND FORMALISM
First, a few definitions are in order. Justice Scalia's originalism rests upon the
original meaning of the Constitution's text.5 This inquiry is not a subjective
quest for what particular Framers had in mind, but an objective understanding
of what the words themselves meant at the time.6 In other words, Justice
Scalia's jurisprudence emphasizes original understanding, not original intent.
Justice Scalia treats his originalism as a species of textualism, because he reads
texts reasonably and naturally for all that they fairly contain.7 Sometimes,
people can disagree about what the original meaning was or how to apply it to a
particular situation, but "[0]ften-indeed, I dare say usually-[original mean-
ing] is easy to discern and simple to apply."s Originalism also helps to preserve
the separation of powers, by keeping courts from encroaching on the legislative
role and democratic will. 9
Originalism likewise protects juries from judicial encroachment. The Found-
ing generation trusted juries, and not judges, in part because King George III
had pressured judges and used them to oppress the colonies. lO Thus, A11icle III
and the Sixth Amendment guarantee criminal petit juries, the Fifth Amendment
guarantees grand juries, and the Seventh Amendment guarantees civil juries. 11
As Justice Scalia put it, the jury is "the spinal column of American democracy"-
the only right that appears in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. 12 He has also cited with approval Blackstone's description of the jury as
5. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id. at 45.
9. See id. at 40--42.
10. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He [the King] has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.").
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, amends. V, VI, VII.
12. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
"'the grand bulwark of [the Englishman's] liberties.,"l3 In the Declaration of
Independence, he has noted, the colonists complained that King George III had
been depriving them of jury trials. l4 The Framers prized the jury as the
representative, democratic lower house of the bicameral judiciary, a populist
check on arbitrary judges. IS The Framers also analogized juries to rnini-
legislatures. l6 As quasi-legislators, jurors apply law to facts ex post and inject
needed flexibility into a rule-bound system. They thus check the inevitable
overinclusiveness of legislation, as well as executive decisions to charge and
prosecute. 17 Originalism therefore seeks to protect the jury's role as a check on
all three branches of government. While we normally speak of separating
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, juries also playa role in the separa-
tion of powers (or checks and balances) in criminal procedure. By safeguarding
juries against judicial encroachment, the Constitution protects juries' power to
check judges, legislatures, and prosecutors.
Though many people criticize his approach as formalistic, Justice Scalia
embraces formalism as the point of the rule of law. 18 As he has put it: "Long
live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of
men.,,19 In a famous essay, he praised "the rule of law as a law of rules.,,20
While generalizations are bound to impose costs because they are always over-
or under-inclusive, the benefits of clear, categorical rules outweigh these costS?1
Clear, general rules, he has argued, promote predictability and equal treatment,
reduce judicial arbitrariness, and foster judicial courage to make unpopular
decisions. 22 By adopting general rules, judges constrain their discretion and
minimize the role of their own policy preferences.23 Juries, he has suggested,
are better suited than judges to exercise discretion and determine reasonable-
ness, because these inquiries are not reducible to judicially administrable rules?4
While not every constitutional provision embodies a clear rule, Justice Scalia's
plain-meaning approach leads him to develop clear rules more often than other
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13. ld. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349).
14. ld. at 30-31 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 15 & 20 (U.S. 1776».
15. See Essays by a Fanner (pt. 4), MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 21, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 36, 38 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1185, 1188-89 (1991). The Anti-Federalists fought for
and won the jury-trial guarantees as part of the Bill of Rights, which strongly suggests that their
understanding of juries was influential and widespread.
16. Amar, supra note 15, at 1187-89.
17. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33,49-54,59,61-64 (2003). .
18. Scalia, supra note 5, at 25 ("Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is
that it is 'formalistic.' The answer to that is, of course it's fonnalistic! The rule of law is about form.").
19. ld.
20. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaws as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1989).
21. ld. at 1177.
22. ld. at 1178-82.
23. ld. at 1179.
24. See id. at 1180-81.
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Justices?5 Thus, while originalism does not always lead to formalism, in Justice
Scalia's view the former tends to produce the latter. For example, the dictionary
definitions of "seizure" and "curtilage" give more precise, formalistic content to
the Fourth Amendment than does a multi-factor balancing test or a free-form
inquiry into the value of privacy?6 Judges can usually "give[] some precise,
principled content" to even the vaguest text, to maximize the rule of law and
minimize the rule of men.27
Justice Scalia's formalism stands in stark contrast to the pragmatism of
his jurisprudential arch rival, Justice Breyer. In Justice Breyer's "consequen-
tial[ist]" view, courts should look not only backward at text, history, and
precedent, but also forward to the likely outcomes of various rulings?8 In other
words, courts need to be practical and flexible enough to adapt their rulings to
reality and necessity. Put another way, Justice Breyer values judicial flexibility,
which leaves judges wiggle room to apply general rules to particular cases in a
manner that seems fair. This forward-looking approach trusts judges' expertise
and ability to forecast wise policy outcomes and to adjust the Constitution
accordingly. It puts less faith in history and in particular legal texts, whose
meaning may be indeterminate.
While Justice Scalia admits that flexibility is a countervailing value, he
emphasizes the need for legislative rather than judicial flexibility?9 Non-
originalism, he notes, usually leads to even less legislative flexibility. Judges
who stray from originalism and formalism tend to constrict the ambit of
democratic government, whereas originalism usually preserves a larger role for
elected legislatures.3o In his view, legislatures-not judges-are primmily respon-
sible for updating the law to fit changing times. Moreover, Justice Scalia puts
more faith in the determinacy of legal sources than Justice Breyer does. The
Constitution has a fixed, ascertainable meaning, and the job of judges is
archaeology, not architecture: they must discover that meaning, not invent it. By
this logic, "We the People ... ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution,"
and unelected judges have neither mandate nor competence to rewrite or change
it. 31
In short, originalism and formalism promise legitimate, neutral sources of
law; clear, predictable, and equal treatment; and checks and balances on judi-
cial, legislative, and executive arbitrariness. Justice Scalia has acknowledged
that text and history can occasionally be unclear, and rules can be overbroad and
25. lei. at 1183-84.
26. See id. at 1184.
27. lei. at 1182-83.
28. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246-47 (2002).
29. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 41-42 (equating flexibility with "the elimination of restrictions upon
democratic government").
30. See id.
31. U.S. CaNST. pmbl.
---
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inflexible. These minor costs, he has argued, are prices worth paying for a rule
of law, not of men.
II. CRAWFORD'S SUCCESS
In the decades leading up to Crawford, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
had become a shambles. Once the Court finally used the Fourteenth Amendment
to incorporate the Confrontation Clause against the states in 1965,32 it groped
for an approach to give the Clause content.33 Ultimately, It conflated and
confused the Clause with nonconstitutional hearsay law, which had developed
well after the Founding?4 In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court suggested that all
hearsay raises a Confrontation Clause problem?5 "[T]he Confrontation Clause
reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial," but according to
Roberts this "preference" was not absolute.36 To overcome this "preference,"
the prosecution had to prove that the hearsay was reliable and, ordinarily, that
the declarant was unavailable.37 Evidence was reliable enough to satisfy the
Clause, Roberts held, if it either fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.,,38
Roberts' tests for reliability proved to be murky, subjective, inconsistent, and
unworkable. 39 Courts applied eight- or nine-factor balancing tests to determine
reliability, and results depended on which factors individual judges chose to
weight heavily.40 As Crawford later noted, courts interpreted the very same
facts differently or accorded identical significance to opposite facts. 41 For
example, one court found a statement to be more reliable because the declarant
32. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). For a succinct summary of the background to
Crawford, from which I draw much of this account, see Richard D. Friedman, The ConfronlC/tion
Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 CATO S. CT. REv. 439.
33. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (suggesting that the Confrontation Clause and
hearsay rules spring from the same sources, but declining to equate the two and confining discussion to
the case before the Coun); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (suggesting that while the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules "are generally designed to protect similar values," hearsay
violations will not always violate the Confrontation Clause nor vice versa; upholding the admission of a
witness's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, because the witness had previously
testified in court and was subject to cross-examination).
34. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (endorsing the "truism that 'hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,' and 'stem from the same roots'"
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155, and Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86».
35. Jd. at 63.
36. [d.; see id. at 64.
37. ld. at 65-66.
38. Jd. at 66.
39. See generally Friedman, supra note 32, at 448-50; Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack,
Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1236-38 (2002) (describing how Roberts's framewOI:k
proved to be difficult to apply in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), even though Lilly "ought to
have been an easy case").
40. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (citing People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401,
406-07 (Colo. 2001) (eight-factor test) and the Washington Court of Appeals' unreported decision in
Crawford (nine-factor test».
41. Jd. (setting forth the contradictory examples listed here in the text).
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was neither in custody nor a suspect.42 Another court, however, found a
statement more reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a
crime, thereby making the statement more clearly against her penal interest.43
One court held that a statement was more reliable because the incriminating
portion was detailed, while another court found a statement more reliable
because the portion incriminating the defendant was "fleeting."44 And· the
Colorado Supreme Court found one statement more reliable because it was
given immediately after the events described, and yet found another statement
more reliable because two years had passed since the events.45 In short, as
Crawford noted, Roberts invited inconsistency and unpredictability.46
This jumbled case law about reliability had strayed far from the constitutional
text and history.47 The text of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
seems clear enough: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....,,48 These words
set forth a bright-line rule, not a balancing test.49 The text says nothing about
policing the substantive reliability of evidence a jury may hear. Rather, juries
may assess substantive reliability themselves, so long as the court first ensures
adversarial procedure, namely confrontation of witnesses by defendants. The
word "witnesses," moreover, does not appear to mean any out-of-court declar-
ant. It denotes those who make formal, recorded statements for, or in anticipa-
tion of, official proceedings.50
Clear history confirms that the Clause's purpose is to prohibit formal out-of-
court testimony and to guarantee face-to-face confrontation and cross-
examination.51 The English common-law tradition had relied on adversarial
testing and cross-examination of live witnesses in open court to inform juries. In
contrast, in the civil-law, inquisitorial system, officials examined witnesses
before trial and introduced their statements at trial instead of using live testi-
mony.52 At times, England adopted this pretrial examination procedure.53 In the
notorious treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the prosecution introduced a letter
42. State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
43. Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
44. Compare People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001) (detailed incriminating portion), with
United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs, Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) ("fleeting"
portion incriminated defendant).
45. Compare Farrell, 34 P.3d at 407 (statement given "immediately after" the events in question),
with Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo. 2001) (statement given two years later).
46. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64-66.
47. Cf Scalia, supra note 5, at 39 (criticizing the habit of building new cases exclusively on the
logic of prior Supreme Court cases rather than the text, "with no regard for how far that logic, thus
extended, has distanced us from the original text and understanding").
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49. See AKHlL REED AMAR, THE CONSTlTtrrl0N AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 126 (1997);
Scalia, supra note 5, at 43-44.
50. See AMAR, supra note 49, at 127-29.
5 L See id at 130; Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO.
LJ. 1011, 1011 (1998).
52. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *373-74 (1768).
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and an unsworn out-of-court Privy Council examination of his alleged accom-
plice. Raleigh demanded that the judges bring his accuser into court, in the
hopes that he would recant, and complained that he was being tried "by the
Spanish Inquisition."54 The court refused, the jury convicted, and Raleigh was
condemned to die.55 In reaction to this and similar abuses, later English cases
and statutes mandated face-to-face confrontation.56 The colonists agreed, decry-
ing ex parte written evidence and insisting on cross-examination as the guaran-
tor of truth.57 Courts allowed only limited exceptions for witnesses who simply
could not testify in person and had previously been subject to cross-examination
by the defendant.58 In short, the core purpose of the Confrontation Clause was
to forbid inquisitorial criminal procedure based on ex pmte written examina-
tions.59
While the Clause ultimately promotes substantive reliability, it does so via a
procedural guarantee of adversarial testing.60 This procedural path to reliability
was designed to constrain judicial discretion because the Framers, mindful of
past judicial abuses, distrusted judges. Thus, the Clause specifies a particular
procedure for testing evidence in front of juries and does not allow judges to
simply substitute another procedure that might appear more effective.61
The procedure chosen by Crawford, requiring cross-examination of all testimo-
nial statements, may reach beyond core out-of-court inquisitorial interrogations.
For example, gentle police questioning of a domestic-abuse or rape victim is not
nearly as shocking nor as umeliable as the torture-induced depositions in
Raleigh's case. My point is not that the Clause is limited to the particular
scenario that the Framers had in mind. Rather, that historical scenario illumi-
nates the plain meaning of the text (exclusion of out-of-court testimony), which
in turn is what governs today.
Crawford's rule hinges on whether the evidence is "testimonial.,,62 However,
53. See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 528-30 (3d ed. 1944); 9 id. at 216-17,
228.
54. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for High Treason, Nov. 17, 1603, in 2 CORBETT'S COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
1, 15 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816).
55. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,44 (2004).
56. !d. at 44-45.
57. ld. at 47-49; cf 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDE CE § 1367, at 32 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed.
1974) (famously describing cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth").
58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-47. The Crawford Court recognized that dying declarations might
qualify as another exception, but it suggested that even if this exception survived it would be sui
generis.ld. at 56 n.6.
59. ld. at 50.
60. Id. at 61-62.
61. Id. at 67-68.
62. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's line between unsworn
testimonial statements and nontestimonial statements because, at common law, only sworn testimony
was admissible evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in tht
judgment). This argument, however, gives insufficient weight to the Raleigh case discussed supra. Set
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the Court did not define that term, leaving its development to the future. At a
minimum, the concept includes prior testimony at preliminary hearings, before
grand juries, at former trials, and in police interrogations.63 While the admissibil-
ity of other evidence, such as 911 calls, remains unsettled,64 Crawford at least
provides a principle and a coherent inquiry for adjudicating Confrontation
Clause disputes.
Crawford was a successful blend of originalism and formalism. The previous
case law had been a mess, relying on indeterminate balancing tests and generat-
ing inconsistent results. It had allowed admission of evidence, such as accom-
plice confessions, that transgressed the historical purpose of the Clause.65 The
case law had veered far from the Clause's text and history, turning its absolute
guarantee of confrontation and cross-examination into a mere "preference."
Crawford's formalistic rule turns on simple, clear requirements of testimony,
cross-examination, and unavailability, rather than ad hoc estimates of reliability.
This formalistic rule is not only clear, but also rooted in the historical record,
giving it objective legitimacy. It serves the historical goal of constraining
judicial discretion and testing evidence before jurors' eyes. And there is no easy
way to evade the rule, because any evidence elicited in anticipation of trial
probably becomes testimony subject to the rule.
Of course, this originalism came at the expense of stare decisis. Precedent
merits respect when it leads to coherence, stability, and predictability. If a line
of precedent proves to be inconsistent and incoherent, it loses many of these
benefits and so deserves less respect. This inquiry requires difficult judgment
calls. How far from history must precedent veer to lose its originalist mooring?
How mushy must precedents be to lose the benefits of formalism? These
text accompanying note 54. In that case, the trial court relied on unsworn testimonial statements to
convict Raleigh without allowing him to cross-examine the declarants; the Confrontation Clause was
designed to prevent such abuses in the future.
63. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67.
64. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant's recorded statements were not testimonial under Crawford), Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So.
2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that defendant's spontaneous statements to her mother
were not testimonial under Crawford), People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874 (Crim. Ct. 2004)
(holding that statements made to police were not testimonial under Crawford), and People v. Moscat,
777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (City Crim. Ct. 2004) (holding that under Crawford a 911 call was not
testimonial and therefore outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause), with Lopez v. State, 888 So.
2d 693, 693-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that defendant's pre-arrest statements to police
were testimonial under Crawford), Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004)
(holding that a child's statements to a social worker were testimonial under Crawford), People v.
Cortez, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 415 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that statements made to a 911 operator were
testimonial under Crawford).
Though Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence criticized the majority's test for merely substituting
one unclear test for another, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment), the majority's test at least provides a principle and touchstone. Whereas Roberts was
inherently unpredictable and unstable, CraH1'ord's approach promises to yield more consistent results
once common-law development fleshes out its contours. See id. at 68 n.l 0 (majority opinion).
65. See Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions, ill Lilly v.
Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 105 (2003).
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questions have no easy answers,66 and even Justice Scalia recognizes stare
decisis as "a pragmatic exception" to consistent originalism and formalism. 67 In
Crawford, however, the Court decided, quite reasonably, that the case law was
irreparably broken and not just bent. It was time to do a thorough overhaul
rather than a tune-up, so stare decisis had to give way.
III. BLAKELY'S MEss
Like Crawford, Blakely arrived after the law had become a muddle, which
made formalism and originalism appealing. By the late twentieth century, the
two halves of criminal trials were subject to widely disparate procedures. In
determining guilt or innocence, courts afforded defendants juries, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory pro-
cess.68 These procedures safeguarded the common-law, adversarial testing of
the prosecution's case in open court, as discussed earlier.69 But few of these
rights applied at sentencing. In most states, the right to a jury trial ended after
the verdict of guilt.70 Sentencing judges relied on ex parte hearsay, hunches,
speculation, and their idiosyncratic temperaments to give sentences anywhere
between probation and life (or death).71 Judges did not have to find any facts,
give any reasons, or meet any particular standard of proof.72 Expert judges
supposedly needed this flexibility to tailor punishments to each offender's
personality, circumstances, and amenability to rehabilitation.73 In other words,
the job of the jury at trial was to make a backward-looking finding of historical
facts about blameworthiness. The job of the sentencing judge was to make a
forward-looking therapeutic diagnosis of an offender's rehabilitative prospects.
Sentencing embraced a medical model and viewed crime as a disease that
required therapeutic expertise to cure.
Beginning in the 1970s, reformers attacked the lawlessness of criminal
sentencing.74 In addition, many people lost faith in rehabilitation, and the
dominant penal philosophy shifted from forward-looking rehabilitation to back-
66. For further discussion of these issues, see generally Mark Tushnet, Self-Fonnalism, Precedent,
and lhe Rule of Law, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1583 (1997); Emil A. KJeinhaus, Note, History as
Precedent: The Posl-Originalist Problem in Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121 (2000).
67. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 140.
68. U.S. CaNST. art. III, amend. VI; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363 (1970).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
70. Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 314, 330 (2003).
71. See generally MARVIN FRA KEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 12-49 (1972).
72. See generally id.
73. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47, 250-51 (1949).
74. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 71, at 5 ("[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers
we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a' society that
professes devotion to the rule of law."); see also Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the
Advance-Sheet Jungle: Criminal Juslice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REv. 311, 323 (1985)
(noting that the "theory and practice of criminal sentencing were escalated to positions of primary
concern in the 1970's").
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ward-looking retribution.75 Sentencing reformers adopted more law-like rules to
channel judicial discretion at sentencing. Sentencing came to tum not on
therapeutic diagnoses, but on findings of historical fact. The older procedural
framework, however, underlay these new rules: judges found these facts, they
did not have to follow adversarial procedures in open court, and the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof was at most a preponderance of the evidence.76
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld these relaxed procedures at sentenc-
ing but offered no clear rules or limits on this practice. For example, judges
were permitted to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that triggered
mandatory-minimum sentences.77 The Court stressed the need to defer to the
legislative will. It also stated that the sentencing enhancement in question did
not create a new Clime nor substitute for any existing crime. It left the door
open, however, to regulate any sentence enhancement that amounted to "a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.,,78 This impressionistic, subjec-
tive standard gave courts very little guidance about how much judicial fact-
finding was too much.
In 2000, a bare majority of the Court superseded this subjective, multi-factor
balancing test with a bright-line rule. Apprendi v. New Jersey held that jmies
must find beyond a reasonable doubt all facts (except recidivism) that increase
;tatutory maximum sentences.79 Blakely and Booker extended Apprendi further,
lpplying it to all facts that increase maximum sentences under sentencing
~uidelines.80 It is noteworthy that Justice Stevens wrote the merits majority
)pinions in Booker and Apprendi, while Justice Scalia wrote the majority
>pinion in Blakely. In each case, more liberal Justices Stevens, Souter, and
:Jinsburg joined more conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas. The originalist
nd formalist reading of the Sixth Amendment dovetailed well enough with
olicitude for criminal defendants' due process rights to forge this unusual
oalition.
Apprendi and Blakely rested on three basic arguments. First, the Founding
eneration attached great importance to jury trials. 81 Second, adopting a bright-
ne rule prevents a slippery slope that would erode juries.82 And third, defen-
75. See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILlTATrvE IDEAL 68-69 (1981); ANDREW
IN HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) (spearheading the resurgence of retribution as the dominant penal
lilosophy); Robert Martinson, What Works-Questions and Answers About Prison Refonn, PUB.
TEREST, Spring 1974, at 22, 48.
76. See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81-82 (1986).
77. See id. at 87-90.
78. Jd. at 88; see id. at 85-86.
79. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter,
nsburg, and Thomas, JJ.).
80. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion on the merits,
ned by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ.); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537
104) (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ.).
ll. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538-39; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477-83.
l2. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539-40 (preferring "Apprendi's bright-line rule" to a multi-factor
ancing test, because the latter is too subjective and manipulable, leaving government officials too
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dants need clear notice of the maximum penalties they face. 83 The Court made
the notice argument only in passing; its historical and slippery-slope arguments
bore most of the weight.
These cases are admirable because they confronted fundamental issues of
criminal law that had long lain dormant. What is a crime? Is it whatever the
legislature labels a crime? And what facts trigger punishment? Must all facts
that justify punishment be included in the crime definition ·itself? For too long,
we have ignored the linkage of crime and punishment. At English common law,
jury trials were about both liability and punishment, as juries manipulated their
verdicts to calibrate punishments to crimes.84 As sentencing rules proliferated
and were codified, sentencing judges decided more and more facts that might
otherwise have been within the province of juries. Until Apprendi, courts had
never delineated what procedures were necessary at sentencing and what issues
were reserved for juries. Apprendi and Blakely linked criminal procedure to
substantive criminal law, as they tried to define crimes and the procedures
needed to link punishments to crimes.
This line of cases tried to ground this definition of crimes and procedures in
originalism and formalism. The Constitution guarantees juries as the finders of
facts that justify conviction and thus punishment. Recent developments had
eroded this role, steadily transferring more factual determinations from trial jury
to sentencing judge. Indeed, many of the blameworthiness and grading issues
that were once built into substantive criminal codes were now handled through
sentencing rules.85 This judicial fact-finding during sentencing had circum-
vented not only juries, but also the rights to confrontation and proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi and Blakely promised to stop this erosion
by requiring jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt of all facts that raise
maximum sentences.
Both originalism and formalism, however, were shaky foundations for this rule. As '.
for originalism, the text of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by
jury "in all criminal prosecutions.,,86 Article Ill's Jury Clause likewise guaran-
tees juries for "The Trial of all Crimes.,,87 Neither provision specifies whether
the jury right extends beyond the verdict of guilt to sentencing procedures.
much power to undercut the role of the jury); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 247-48 (1999) (noting that the Founders feared "that the jury right could be lost not only
by gross denial, but by erosion"».
83. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540,2542; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478,483 n.IO.
84. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,40-41,52-55 (1983).
85. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-Sa-Model Penal Code, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REp. 112, 1J2-13 (1994) (conceptualizing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a back-end
way to grade criminal offenses and punishments, thus compensating for Congress's inability to simplify
and rationalize the federal criminal code, but arguing that the Guidelines do not perfonn this task
especially well).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
87. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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The history of these clauses is no clearer. The particular issue of sentence
enhancements neither arose nor was resolved in the eighteenth century.88 Crimi-
nal procedure was in flux at the time, and overt sentencing discretion was a new
development that had not yet taken firm shape. The older tradition, up through
the eighteenth century, had been that verdicts of guilt led directly to fixed felony
sentences. While juries sometimes adjusted their verdicts to influence sentences,
there was no separate sentencing phase.89 But in the late eighteenth century,
penitentiaries began to replace capital and corporal punishment, and judges
gained wide discretion to sentence defendants within broad ranges of years.90
No particular procedures guided or constrained this unilateral judicial discre-
tion. Judges could base sentences upon any facts that they chose to find, under
any standard of proof, or upon no facts at all. 91 Criminal procedure, in short,
was in flux. In some places, and for some crimes, there was no sentencing phase
at all, while elsewhere judges were beginning to enjoy unchecked sentencing
discretion. The Court, for its part, has repeatedly reaffirmed this long tradition
of judicial discretion to find facts at sentencing and sentence within broad
ranges.92
Instead of Founding-era history, the Apprendi Court relied on treatises written
a century later, while Justice Thomas's concurrence relied on nonconstitutional
cases from the mid- to late-nineteenth century.93 These sources are very weak
evidence of the original understanding of the Constitution. At best, the Court is
creatively translating an eighteenth-century guarantee at a high level of general-
ity into radically different circumstances.94 At worst, the Court is stretching
equivocal history to fit a novel proposition. Either way, the history is hardly an
unequivocal, neutral oracle or firm foundation.
Moreover, the Court is unwilling to turn the clock back all the way. Article III
of the Constitution mandates that "[t]he trial of all Crimes ... shall be by
Jury,,,95 giving citizen-jurors a non-waivable, structural check on judicial and
prosecutorial overreaching. Unlike the Sixth Amendment, Article III is not
phrased as a right belonging to the accused. It was meant to be a right of We the
88. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,244 (1999).
89. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-80 (2000) (citing sources in support of this
proposition); Jones, 526 U.S. at 244-45 & n.7 (same).
90. See, e.g., An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, \ Stat.
112, 112-\9 (1790) (creating thirteen crimes with sentencing ranges from up to one year to up to seven
years' imprisonment and one punishable by unlimited imprisonment and fines at the judge's discretion,
as well as six capital crimes); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 28\-83 (2d ed.
1985) (noting a trend away from capital punishment beginning in the late 1780s).
91. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 24\,244-45 (1949).
92. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2005) (Stevens, J., majority opinion on the
merits); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
93. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-78, 482 n.9, 490 n.\5; id. at 500-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. See Booker, \25 S. Ct. at 752 (Stevens, J., majority opinion on the merits) (describing the
Court's challenge as "preserving an ancient guarantee [of trial by jury] under a new set of circum-
,tances").
95. U.S. CaNST. art. IIl, § 2, d. 3.
People to administer justice, not simply a right of defendants to waive (or be
coerced into waiving).96 Yet today, jury trials resolve fewer than four percent of
criminal cases.97 Though plea bargaining subverts this constitutional mandate,
no court is about to abolish it in the name of originalism, lest criminal trials
overwhelm the justice system.
One might think that half an originalist loaf in Apprendi and Blakely is better
than none at all. After all, even though the Court chose not to disturb plea
bargaining, it at least appeared to shore up juries by limiting some forms of
judicial sentencing discretion. Sometimes half a loaf is better than none, but in
this case it is not. I have argued elsewhere that by grafting an eighteenth-
century trial rule onto a twenty-first-century plea-bargaining landscape, the
Court exacerbated some of plea bargaining's flaws. 98 Apprendi deprived many
defendants of their right to a hearing, exacerbated charge bargaining, and
further imbalanced plea-bargaining power in favor of prosecutors and against
judges.99 Because the Court mandated one originalist rule at trial without
forbidding circumvention via plea bargaining, it opened the door to unantici-
pated and perverse results. lOo Likewise, the Court's willingness to regulate
guidelines sentencing, but not discretionary sentencing, may perversely push
legislatures toward broader sentencing ranges, looser rules, and fewer checks on
judges. 101 In short, in the real world of the second best, a little bit of originalism
may be worse than none at all because of its inconsistency.
The disappearance of juries undermines Apprendi and Blakely's idealized
eighteenth-century rule in yet another way. The eighteenth-century separation of
powers is anachronistic in twenty-first century criminal procedure-there are
hardly any juries left to protect. Rather than trying to separate the powers of
juries and judges strictly, perhaps we should emphasize checks and balances
among the remaining actors. 102 If the real problem is prosecutorial dominance
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96. See Amar, supra note 15, at 1196-99; see also John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written
Constitutions, IS HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 119, 121-22 (1992) (adding that defendants had the right to
waive jury trials but that prosecutors were not meant to be in the business of pressuring them to waive
it); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'y REV. 261,
261 (1979).
97. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2003, tbls. 5.17,5.46 (noting that 3.7% of federal criminal cases and 3% of state felony cases end in
jury trials).
98. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty
Pleas, lIOYALEL.J.1097, 1152-73 (2001).
99. After Booker, this description may be more true of state sentencing than of federal sentencing.
Booker's import is not yet clear, but its quirky remedy (authored by Justice Breyer, and from which
Justice Scalia dissented) may give judges substantially more discretion and restore some balance of
plea-bargaining power in the federal system. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738,756-57 (2005)
(Breyer, J., remedy majority opinion).
100. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 1152-73.
101. See infra text accompanying note 108.
102. I have developed the arguments in this paragraph at greater length elsewhere. See Stephanos
Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2002); Stephanos
Bibas, Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas, 54 STAN. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2001).
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of charging and plea bargaining, perhaps we should give judges power to offset
charging decisions at the sentencing stage. Moreover, collaboration among
legislatures, prosecutors, public defenders, and judges can produce rules that are
more equal and predictable than individual judges' or prosecutors' habits, yet
more flexible and refined than mandatory-minimum legislation. 103 This kind of
collaborative experimentation is very different from strict separation of powers,
and it simply does not fit within Justice Scalia's formalist model. 104
The formalism of Apprendi and its progeny was no more successful than the
Court's originalism. Blakely and Booker's bright-line rule covers any fact that
raises a defendant's maximum sentence, whether under a statute or a sentencing
guideline. 105 Though this bright-line formalism was supposed to prevent erosion
of the jury-trial right, it is remarkably easy to evade. Legislatures can still
undercut juries by raising maximum sentences, rephrasing aggravators as mitiga-
tors, or simply returning unfettered sentencing discretion to judges. 106 Prosecu-
tors can get around it by stacking multiple charges to raise the overall maximum
consecutive sentence. The very clarity and clear edges of the bright-line rule
point the way to evasion. As the dissenters observed, the Court's rule boils
down to another drafting hoop through which legislatures must jump. 107 Oddly,
then, the Court felt it had to threaten additional unspecified regulation of any
efforts to evade its bright-line rule. J08 So even though the bright-line rule was
intended to shore up jury trials, it will not suffice to prevent erosion of that
right.
Even if this formalistic rule did work, it would come at a very high price. It
may prejudice defendants at trial (by letting juries hear aggravating facts that
would otherwise wait until sentencing) or else require complex and expensive
bifurcation. 109 It also unsettles tens of thousands of criminal sentences, flooding
courts with appeals and habeas petitions. I 10 It creates many more opportunities
for prosecutors to engage in charge bargaining, undercutting equal treatment. III
And Apprendi seriously skews the balance of plea-bargaining power in many
103. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2552~58, 2560--61 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-64 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (affirming the constitutionality of the
United States Sentencing Commission, a legislatively created agency within the judicial branch, over a
separation-of-powers dissent by Justice Scalia). Though the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are widely
reviled, state guidelines that emerged from open, collaborative processes have been more successful
and widely hailed. See, e.g., DALE PARENT, STRUCTURING CRJMINAL SENTENCES 203-04 (1988) (noting
that Minnesota's guidelines emerged from an open "new model of guideline developmem" and have
proven to be a "visible success").
105. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (Stevens, J., opinion on the merits);
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536-38.
106. For more detail on this point, see Bibas, supra note 98, at 1134-39.
107. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see id. at 544-49 (fearing that
the majority's rule might be broader and thus radically disrupt sentencing law and practice).
108. See id. at 490 n.16 (majority opinion); Bibas, supra note 98, at 1136 n.265.
109. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 1143-44.
110. See id. at 1145-48.
111. See id. at 1168-70.
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cases, giving prosecutors more power and sentencing judges less. This jury-trial
right may, perversely, result in more prosecutorialleverage to extort waivers of
jury trials. 112 The Court, captivated by an idealized vision of jury trials, failed to
appreciate the magnitude of these real-world consequences. Indeed, the seminal
case in this line, Apprendi, did not mention plea bargains. 113 The apparent
neutrality and clarity of formalism may have blinded some Justices to these
weighty, functional concerns.
In short, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker asked good questions but reached
flawed answers. The definitions of crimes and their linkage with sentence
lengths and procedures are of great importance. But the eighteenth century has
no easy, concrete answer for this twenty-first-century question, because sentenc-
ing discretion was in flux. Even if there were a neat answer, the Court is not
radical enough to abolish plea bargaining and judicial sentencing discretion to
return us to a consistent originalist approach. In addition, the Court's formalistic
answer is too easy for legislatures and prosecutors to evade. More modest
answers, such as heightened procedwal protections during sentencing or bans
on deceptive sentencing enhancements, would ultimately have been more work-
able and solidly grounded. 114 By stretching originalism and formalism beyond
their limits, the Court over-reached and created an unworkable sentencing mess.
IV ORIGINALISM VERSUS FORMALISM
Up until now, I have discussed originalism and formalism in tandem, as if
they were natural bedfellows. But do the two really belong together? As I have
suggested earlier, the two methodologies not only spring from different sources,
but sometimes come into conflict. Subpart A below explores the compatibility
of these two approaches. Subpart B considers which of the two is really driving
the Court. Though he relies heavily on originalism, at root Justice Scalia's
opinions rest more on formalism. Formalism, however, holds much less sway
over other members of the Court, for whom originalism is the more powerful
force. .
A. COMPLEMENTARY OR CLASHING?
One might be tempted to lump originalism and formalism together, in part
because the same jurists, notably Justices Scalia and Thomas, tend to embrace
both. Sometimes the two dovetail neatly. Where the text and historical record
disclose a bright-line rule, the originalist approach leads one to a formalistic
rule. 1l5 This is true, for example, of Crawford's approach to the Confrontation
Clause. The text and history of the clause say nothing about judicial balancing
of a statement's reliability. They simply guarantee the right to confront and
112. See id. at 1152-67.
113. See id. at 1148 & n.322.
114. [d. at 1174-83.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27.
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cross-examine any adverse witness, a historical bright-line rule. 116 The same is
true of the Double Jeopardy Clause's historical, bright-line limitation to crimi-
nal cases. The text of the Clause forbids twice placing a person in jeopardy of
"life or limb" for the "same offence," 117 meaning criminal punishment for a
criminal offense. Surrounding clauses of the Fifth Amendment guarantee the
privilege against self-incrimination "in any criminal case" and grand jury
indictments for any "capital, or otherwise infamous crime.,,118 Finally, history
confirms that the purpose of the double-jeopardy protection was limited to
criminal punishments.1l9 Though the Supreme COUlt tried extending double-
jeopardy protection to civil fines,120 this extension proved to be unworkable and
hard to administer. Ultimately, the Court limited the Clause's scope to criminal
prosecutions, returning to a workable, clear, simple rule grounded in history.121
Text and history, however, sometimes support a balancing test rather than a
bright-line rule. A good example is the Fourth Amendment, which judges have
interpreted to require warrants, probable cause, and the exclusionary rule. These
bright-line rules are clear mandates that promise to guide and constrain police
discretion. But when these rules proved to be rigid and overbroad, courts
created a thicket of increasingly arcane exceptions to the warrant, probable
cause, and exclusionary rules. As an originalist matter, however, the Fourth
Amendment requires only that searches be reasonable, and reasonableness
sounds much more like a multi-factor balancing test than a clear rule. 122 Thus,
one must distinguish originalism from formalism and, if the two clash, deter-
mine which should prevail.
B. AT ROOT, IS THE COURT ORlGINALIST OR FORMALIST?
Which of these two principles is ultimately driving the Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence? The Court's rhetoric on this point is mixed. In Craw-
ford, Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Court with pages of historical and
textual analysis. After discussing English and American colonial history, Justice
Scalia concluded that the Clause was designed to prevent in-court use of ex
parte out-of-court witness examinations. 123 The history and text "do[] not
suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be
116. See supra Part II.
In. u.s. CONST. amend. V .
1]8. ld.
I]9. See Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, ]06 YALE L.J. 1807, 18]0 (1997).
120. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S 93 (1997).
121. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99.
122. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,762-811,
816-19 (1994) (demonstrating that, as a textual and historical matter, the Fourth Amendment requires
neither warrants, nor probable cause, nor the exclusionary rule, but only reasonableness, and that juries
should assess reasonableness ex post as a matter of common sense; recognizing, however, that
legislatures, judges, and administrative agencies may to help define reasonableness).
123. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,42-50 (2004).
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developed by the courts.... [They] admit[] only those exceptions established at
the time of the founding."124 Justice Scalia then criticized Roberts' "malleable
[reliability] standard,,125 as "unpredictable [and] ... amorphous, if not entirely
subjective.,,126 This unpredictable standard afforded little safeguard against
clear violations of the Clause and produced inconsistent and contradictory
outcomes.127 Though this strand of argument is fOlmalist, the Court ultimately
rested its decision on originalism: "The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test,
however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to ex-
clude."128
What is most impressive about Crawford is how its skillful blend of original-
ism and formalism persuaded seven members of the Court to throw out decade~
of precedent. Crawford's formalism highlighted the inconsistent, unpredictabh
muddle that had emerged from a hopelessly vague test. And Crawford's original
ism was a compelling account of the Confrontation Clause's purpose and hoy
ad hoc decisionmaking has drifted away from that aim. These powerful an,
coherent accounts persuaded even fair-weather originalists that originalism an
formalism worked well here. Even a functionalist can see the strong function;
value of originalism and formalism in this case, much as a utilitarian cc
sometimes see the value of following rules. 129 Thus, liberal concern for crimin
defendants' rights dovetailed with conservative reverence for the Founding aT
distrust of government and balancing tests.
In the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases, however, originalism was not t
driving force. True, Apprendi cited much history in support of its jury-tr
right. 130 But the same members of the Court admitted in Jones, the precursor
Apprendi, that no history squarely supported this rule: "[T]he scholarship
which we are aware does not show that a question exactly like this one was e
raised and resolved in the period before the Framing." 131 As discussed,
eighteenth-century evidence does not address the sentencing phase, and
nineteenth-century evidence comes far too late to illuminate the Bill of Right~
Perhaps, as Booker argues, one can creatively "preserv[e] an ancient [jury-tJ
124. /d. at 54.
125. Id. at 60.
126. Id. at 63.
127. Id. at 63-64.
128. Id. at 63
129. Cf FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHlLOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 99 (1991) (stating that "as long as the virtues of having rules
considered as part of the relevant circumstances of each act" they are "fully consistent \
act-utilitarianism outlook").
130. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477-83 (2000); id. at 501-18 (ThO!
concuning).
131. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).
132. See supra Part III.
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guarantee under a new set of circumstances."133 But the gulf between having no
sentencing phase and the modem sentencing mini-trial is so great that it is hard
to see this novel rule as originalist. A radical origina1ist might have outlawed
plea bargaining and mandated a return to fixed sentencing, or at least transferred
all sentencing discretion to juries. However, even these solutions would have
collided with the eighteenth-century sentencing flux; by 1791, judges were
beginning to exercise broad discretion in imposing indeterminate sentences. 134
But there is no neat, bright-line originalist approach to sentencing, and even if
there were, a majority of the Court would not be willing to go so far. Because
the Court was unwilling to divest judges of sentencing discretion,135 it could not
really claim an originalist mandate for its rule.
Rather, the Apprendi-Blakely rule was motivated less by originalism than by
formalism. Apprendi referred repeatedly to the fear of a slippery slope that
would gradually erode the role of juries. 136 Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Apprendi rested explicitly on the need for a coherent bright line: "What
ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable to say
what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they assert, it does not
~uarantee [jury findings of facts that raise maximum sentences]. They provide
10 coherent alternative."137 In Blakely, Justice Scalia reiterated the importance
)f a coherent bright line, justifying Apprendi's rule by "the need to give
ntelligible content to the right of jury trial.,,138 Clarity not only constrains
Idges, but also gives prospective criminals fair warning of the maximum
;ntences they may face. 139 Justice Scalia criticized the dissent for relying on a
Ibjective, manipulable, incoherent balancing test. 140 In a scathingly sarcastic
lotnote, he mocked McMillan's tail-wags-the-dog standard as ridiculously
lbjective and not moored in the Constitution. 141 This attack highlights Justice
l33. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 752 (2005) (Stevens, J., majority opinion on the
rits).
34. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 1125-26 & n.209 (noting that even at the time of the Founding,
~es had broad sentencing discretion in misdemeanor cases, broad discretion to mitigate felony
:ences, and broad discretion under some newer statutes that authorized wide ranges of imprison-
It); see also KATE STITH & JosE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUlDELlNES IN THE
oRAL COURTS 9 (1998) ("From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with
~ sentencing discretion ... permitting the sentencing judge 10 impose any term of imprisonment and
fine up to the statutory maximum").
;5. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481-82 & n.9; see also supra Pan III.
6. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-85 & n.ll.
7. Jd. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
8. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
9. ld. at 2540,2542.
). See id. at 2537 n.6, 2539--40.
l. As Justice Scalia put it:
'a be sure, Justice BREYER and the other dissenters would forbid those increases of sentence
lat violate the constitutional principle that tail shall not wag dog. The source of this principle
. entirely unclear. Its precise effect, if precise effect it has, is presumably to require that the
ttio of sentencing-factor add-on to basic criminal sentence be no greater than the ratio of
lUdal vertebrae to body in the breed of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater
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Scalia's contempt for multi-factor balancing tests and his desire for formalism
to constrain judges-or as he put it, "the rule of law as a law of rules." 142 Thus
he cast the deciding vote, in Harris, to let judges find facts that trigger
mandatory minimum sentences, in part because these minima are rules that
constrain judicial discretion. 143
Indeed, Justice Scalia seems to embrace originalism precisely as a brand of
formalism. He has suggested that originalism provides a clear, neutral, bright-
line way to resolve cases clearly and with a minimum of judicial discretion. l44
But, as Booker candidly acknowledged, there is no clear historical precedent to
constrain the originalist inquiry here. Because there was no clear sentencing law
at the time of the Founding, any originalist effort must be creative and com-
plex. 145 Thus originalism does not lead to formalism here, and forcing the
history into a formalistic mold produced a rule that is neither historical nor
workable.
In the end, originalism can be neither consistent nor thorough when a
majority of the Justices are fair-weather originalists. The decision to follow
originalism, then, is not automatic, but the result of balancing many consider-
ations. But originalism has enough appeal that it occasionally sways Justices
who are not consistent originalists. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, for
example, Justice Souter wrote for the Court that police may make warrantless
arrests for the misdemeanor of driving without a seatbelt. 146 His decision relied
heavily on eighteenth-century precedents, such as constables' power to make
warrantless arrests of negligent carriage drivers,147 and not primarily on policy
considerations.
In other areas of criminal procedure, a majority of the Court breaks with
Justice Scalia's originalism and formalism where a balancing-test approach
seems more just. In Herrera v. Collins, for example, a majority of the Court
suggested that the Constitution might forbid executing actually innocent con-
victs under some circumstances, despite Justice Scalia's disagreement. 148 In
Harmelin v. Michigan, a majority of the Court read the Eighth Amendment as
requiring a proportionality balancing test for non-capital sentences, over Justice
than the average such ratio for all breeds. Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi has
prevented full development of this line of jurisprudence.
Jd. at2542n.13.
142. See Scalia, supra note 20, at 1175_
143_ See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); see also Stephanos Bibas, Back from the
Brink, 15 FED. SENTENCING REp. 79, 80-81 (2002).
144. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 45, 47.
145. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 75 I-52 (2005) (Stevens, J., majority opinion on
the merits).
146. 532 U.S 318,354-55 (2001).
147. See id. at 335.
148. 506 U.S. 390,417-19 (1993) (assuming arguendo that "a truly persuasive demonstration of
'actual innocence'" might trigger an Eighth Amendment right); id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting any constitutional right to claim innocence after conviction).
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Scalia's contrary argument. 149 And in Walton v. Arizona, Justice Scalia argued
that the Eighth Amendment requires no individualized capital sentencing, but
the Court ultimately ignored his originalist, bright-line argument. 150
In sum, originalism is a powerful force in criminal procedure, and it often
leads to formalism. At times, however, originalism seems to be a cloak for
formalism, invoked (as in Blakely) even where there is no solid, workable
originalist answer. Perhaps as a result of this sleight of hand, while Justice
Scalia's originalist and formalist approach to criminal procedure periodically
triumphs on the Court, it enjoys no consistent majority.
CONCLUSION
Originalism and formalism are powerful methodologies in criminal procedure, and
with good reason. At its best, as in Crawford, Justice Scalia's approach succeeds in its
aims: it anchors criminal procedure in text and history, provides clear neutral starting
points, and shores up separation of powers. By doing so, it also constrains judicial
discretion, maximizes legislative flexibility, and protects juries. Thus, in appropriate
cases, both originalism and fOlmalism deserve prominent, if not dominant, places in
criminal procedure. Perhaps I should call this Essay ''Two Cheers for Originalism and
Formalism" for just that reason. But at its worst, as in Blakely, Justice Scalia's
approach fails in these aims: it over-reads cryptic or muddled text and history,
becomes rigid and unworkable, and thwarts checks and balances.
In the end, we are indebted to Justice Scalia for reinvigorating originalism
and formalism, which deserve to flourish where firm constitutional soil will
support their roots. Text, history, and precedent ought at least to be the starting
points for constitutional inquiry, and often these starting points will lead to
workable, bright-line rules. But we should also be wary of exalting these
principles above all others, particularly where the textual and. historical soil is
absent or a morass. The other Justices do well to exercise prudent judgment in
discerning when to temper Justice Scalia's impractical excesses. When they do
not do so, as in Blakely, formalism undercuts the old-fashioned judicial virtues
of humility, practicality, and plain old common sense.
149. 501 U.S. 957, 993 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.,for himself and Rehnquist, c.J.)
(rejecting any proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment); id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., joined by
O'Connor and Souter, n., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing, in the
controlling opinion, "a narrow proportionality principle").
150. 497 U.S. 639, 671 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(rejecting the Woodson-Lockett-Eddings line of cases as inconsistent with the text and historical
meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
